[paper in progress presented in VII World Conference of Bioethics – Spain, 2011]
Introduction: This presentation analyzes some bioethical aspects
on the involvement of other animals in research - the animal experimentation.
Firstly, we compare the
rejection and the acceptance of animal experimentation in the
teleological-based theories (as in Peter Singer’s and Carl Cohen’s writings)
and the deontological-based theory (as in Tom Regan’s and Jan Naverson’s
writings): what are the basis for rejecting or for accepting animal
experimentation¿ Secondly, we compare the ideas of the value of life and the
harms of the death in Singer and Regan’s theories: what is the value of the
animal life itself if compared with other values¿ Some epistemological
considerations to bioethics are made too.
The results are contrary too our normal acceptance of animal experimentation and suggest revision of this
institution: from animal
experimentation to research with animal subjects, like the ethical research
with vulnerable human subjects.
Aims: We aim to clarify the bioethical problem of the use of
nonhuman animals in scientific research presenting some of the principal ethical considerations about this topic, including to analyze the topic of the
value of life of nonhuman animals and the harm of the premature death.
Methods: We assume, for the argument, that there are two
principal normative theories in ethics and bioethics: teleological-based
theories and deontological-based theories. Teleological-based analyze the moral
concepts and moral problems in terms of results or consequences of the action
(or rule of action) for the affected agents and patients of that action. In
general it is an utilitarian theory. Deontological-based theories analyze the
moral concepts and moral problems in terms of the intrinsic nature of the
action (or rule of action) expressed generally in norms or principles. In
general it is a Kantian theory, and contemporarily it tends to be a
rights-based theory (for example, a human rights-based theory or fairness and
justice accounts). In bioethics, the concept of value of the life and problems on
killing can be interpreted following an Utilitarian or a Kantian theory:
utilitarian will access the value of life and killing as function of the
goodness or good states of affairs that will result from these actions. In
contrast, Kantian will access them as function of the intrinsic respect for the
subjects or fairness expressed in the actions among themselves. Many arguments
in Bioethics are utilitarian, and many are Kantians, and probably the best
account uses the two ways of thinking.
Materials: The facts about animal life and the involvement of
animals in animal experimentation are, generally: the similarities of nonhumans
animals with us humans in terms of psychological characteristics, the possible
or actual pain or suffering by-produced by catering and manipulating animals in
the experiments, the premature and intentional death of the animals, the good
things we can possibly or actually provide for other animals and specially for
human beings (knowledge, medicines, technologies), the long tradition of animal
experimentation meaning convenience and psychological security.
Appling the
teleological approach on these facts, Peter Singer has concluded that the most
part of the actually existent animal experimentation is wrong, because in
balance it causes more evils that goods, specially for animals, but Carl Cohen
has concluded that it is right, because it produced more benefits that harms,
specially for human beings. Applying the deontological approach, Tom Regan has
concluded animal experimentation is wrong because it is unjust or unfair to moral
patients, but Jan Naverson thinks it is right, because the concepts of fairness
and justice do not apply to non rational beings. We can analyze the arguments pro
and con in comparison with each other. And we can compare the arguments contra
animal experimentation in the comparison with each other.
Analysis: Tom Regan has rejected completely animal
experimentation because the harmful involvement of non-human animals in these researches.
He thought this because the (supposed) animal rights: if a being has the right
of life, of bodily integrity and of natural liberty, we should respect these
rights even if the disregarding would result in better things for other beings.
This is so because this is the case with vulnerable and weak human beings, for
example: they have their rights protecting their lives, integrity and liberty
specially because as patients they are vulnerable and weak and could be abused
by other humans. However the same is the case for (non-human) animals. If this
would be accepted, the use of animal experimentation, in the past and in the
present, were and are wrong and should be reformed or abolished. Jon Naverson and Carl Cohen, based on the
same notion of equal rights for human beings, have accepted animal
experimentation - provided it causes the less pain or suffering as it is possible
- (Naverson in fact says we can do anything to animals as we like, but probably
he was thinking more theoretically than practically): for both non-human
animals have not individual and basic rights because they, as a community, have
not the practical notion or the understanding of what is to have a right and a
duty (Cohen’s point), and/or because they are not rational and contractual
agents with reciprocal capacities of changes (Naverson’s point). We should evaluate
animal experimentation only in terms of good or bad results from it, and about
this, we should compare the many good consequences of the animal
experimentation for so many humans and the harms caused to some limited number
of nonhuman animals. Cohen uses the example of polio vaccine: according to him
it would not have been discovered without animal experimentation. After discovered, it saved so many lives. How
could we be contra animal experimentation in this case¿ Peter Singer disagree
with all them, Regan, Cohen and Naverson: the harmful use of nonhuman animals
in animal experimentation depends in fact of the balance of good and bad
consequences, but the well informed and impartial (moral) balance is not
favorable to the most part of the actual experimentation. Except when the
result will probably be better than evil things, and very important stakes are
in play (important diseases), animal experimentation should be restricted
because in the most cases these good results probabilities are very small or
lesser than the actual and certain evil effects on animals. In the majority of the
examples using animals is wrong. One criterion for critical ethical assessment
is the acceptance to use a mentally defective newborn human orphan in a
research: if it is not acceptable by the conscious researchers, then, the
specific research is not right with nonhuman animals too. This is because a newborn
orphan has the same relevant characteristics
that nonhuman animals have: they can suffer pain and distress, and they can
live a good life in a certain time.
?
?
Singer and Regan disagree specially about
the harm of the death. For Singer the value of life is a function of the
satisfaction of present preferences of sentient beings. If a being has not the preference
for living in the future, being only sentient, her preferences are only no
suffering and no pain. So, if an animal, human or non-human, is only sentient,
the value of life for her is the value of her present preferences and the painless
use in experimentation with of course instant death would not be harm for these
sentient beings. In cases when there are clear and strong benefits for other
beings, and they are a majority in numbers, this use could be right or at least
ethically acceptable. For Regan the value of life in not only a function of the
satisfaction of preferences, but a function of the opportunities that that life
contains (good life in the future, liberty for exercising her abilities with
bodily integrity) and the best interest of the patient. As the interests in
life, liberty and integrity of some beings (subject-of-a-mental-life) are a
vital ones as opportunities, and as the protection of these vital interests are
protected by limits in the communal or personal search for goods, these limits
(basic rights) are what we need to guarantee the best interest of these sentient
beings (human or nonhuman animals).
There is something to be said about Cohen's belief, widespread among scientists, that
without animal experimentation, medical
advances would not have been possible, and
will not be possible in the future. First
of all, this is a factual hypothesis, and may be false. As writes David DeGrazia, "just because you gave me a metro
ticket does not mean I needed it to get there. Maybe I could go on foot or by bus. Some
critics say that we have made progress despite the biomedical animal
experimentation, not because of it. Lafollete Hugh and
Niall Shanks (1996) have evaluated that the confidence in animal
models has delayed the development of an effective polio vaccine for
many years. It may be that the same happened in other cases of
vaccines and medicines, and is happening today with the current
investigations "more important"! It may be, after
all, that exist research methods without animal experimentation that
will lead to the same progress. How
do I know rationally that without investing in them and do the
assessment seriously¿ In addition, any honest
analysis of the cost effectiveness has to multiply the value of an expected
benefit by the probability of achieving it, and decrease of the
worthlessness of harm multiplied by the probability to do so. In the case of animal
experimentation, the harms are
always liquid and certain, but not
the benefits.
Conclusions: If we accept human rights in the wide sense of the expression,
including vulnerable human beings, then, we should conclude that the argument contra
animal experimentation is stronger than the argument for. If we accept the opportunity
theory of the value of life, we should conclude that the rights-based argument contra
animal experimentation is stronger than the utilitarian one. We could use
alternative means, specially the replacement of (harmful) animal experimentation by (therapeutic) research with animal subjects of research, following the same
guidelines we use for vulnerable human beings as subjects of research. This seems
the price of being ethical when using animals in research.
Alcino Eduardo Bonella
Institute of Philosophy (IFILO), Federal University of Uberlândia (UFU),
National Counsel for Research (CNPq)
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